The impact of redistributive policies on inequality in OECD countries by Doerrenberg, Philipp & Peichl, Andreas
Dis cus si on Paper No. 14-012
The Impact of Redistributive Policies  
on Inequality in OECD Countries 
Philipp Doerrenberg and Andreas Peichl
Dis cus si on Paper No. 14-012
The Impact of Redistributive Policies  
on Inequality in OECD Countries 
Philipp Doerrenberg and Andreas Peichl
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp14012.pdf
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von  
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung  
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other  
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly  
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
The Impact of Redistributive Policies on
Inequality in OECD Countries∗
Philipp Doerrenberg Andreas Peichl
February 3, 2014
Abstract
Due to behavioral effects triggered by redistributional interventions, it is still
an open question whether government policies are able to effectively reduce
income inequality. We contribute to this research question by using differ-
ent country-level data sources to study inequality trends in OECD countries
since 1980. We first investigate the development of inequality over time before
analyzing the question of whether governments can effectively reduce inequal-
ity. Different identification strategies, using fixed effects and instrumental
variables models, provide some evidence that governments are capable of re-
ducing income inequality despite countervailing behavioral responses. The
effect is stronger for social expenditure policies than for progressive taxation.
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1 Introduction
Recent discussions about rising inequality in OECD countries have triggered re-
curring calls for more government intervention and redistribution (see, e.g., OECD
2011). These calls for action implicitly assume that governments are capable of
reducing inequality despite potential countervailing behavioral effects. However,
considering the relevant literature, it is still an open empirical question whether
government intervention can effectively reduce inequality due to countervailing be-
havioral effects.1 In our paper, we contribute to this research question by examining
inequality trends in OECD countries between 1981 and 2005 using different country-
level data sets. We first look at the development of income inequality over time be-
fore investigating whether different redistributive policy measures effectively reduce
inequality. In particular, we look at the effect of three explanatory policy variables of
interest—government spending, social expenditure, and progressive taxation—on the
Gini coefficient of income inequality. We use different identification strategies and
data sources to approach our research question and to overcome potential problems
of endogeneity.
While the effect of redistributing policies on inequality appears obvious and
trivial on the first glance, the expected impact is theoretically less straight-forward
if behavioral (second-round) adjustments of economic agents are considered and
accounted for. Of course, progressive taxation and social expenditures, which benefit
the poor relatively more, reduce the difference between pre- and post-government
inequality. This direct inequality reducing effect is confirmed by empirical studies
based on individual-level data that study the effect of social policies on the difference
between pre- and post-government inequality distributions (e.g., Garfinkel et al.
2006; Fuest et al. 2010).
However, one has to also consider indirect second-round effects on the pre-
government distribution of income which might yield an opposite effect and could
eventually overcompensate the initial positive effect (e.g., Sinn 1995; Poterba 2007).
Many redistributive policies such as progressive taxes or social benefits reduce incen-
tives to work or to invest. Given the findings in the literature (e.g., Roed and Strom
2002) that labor supply elasticities are higher at the bottom of the income distribu-
tion than at the top, it is likely the case that labor supply reduction in response to
1The OECD has started the New Approaches to Economic Challenges (NAEC) initiative with
the aim to help countries not only deliver strong growth, but also to support a fairer distribution,
among others. The key elements of this exercise include to revisit the fundamental assumptions
about the functioning of the economy and to better address the synergies, complementarities and
trade-offs between policies (see OECD 2012c for an overview). Our paper contributes to the aims
of this initiative by providing evidence of the inequality reducing potential of government policies
when taking into account the equity-efficiency trade-off.
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redistribution measures is more prevalent among the poor than among the rich. It
can thus be presumed that redistribution increases pre-government inequality and
therefore, obviously, also post-government inequality.2
Another reason for behavioral second-round effects is grounded in the wage-
setting behavior of employers. In countries with high levels of redistribution, employ-
ers might shift away any social responsibility because they expect the government to
ensure decent levels of inequality and fairness. Following this argument, gross-wages
of employees are lower than in a world without redistribution, whereas employers’
profits are c.p. higher; thus implying higher pre-government inequality. Both effects
potentially (partly) offset the initial positive first-round effect of redistribution on
equality. It is to empirical analyses to explore whether second-round effects outweigh
first-round effects or not.
Unfortunately, however, finding the causal effect of redistributive generosity on
levels of post-government income inequality is characterized by difficulties. There
is no quasi-experimental set-up available to identify a truly causal effect, but we
nevertheless think, in the sense of Imbens (2010), that an attempt ought to be made
to answer such a relevant research question as credible as possible. As in most obser-
vational empirical applications that strive at finding the effect of policy measures on
outcome variables, one has to be aware that policy measures are themselves respon-
sive to economic and/or political conditions and therefore usually endogenous. In
order to overcome any resulting empirical problems, careful empirical work requires
identifying the channels of how the policies of interest are shaped. All channels that
affect both the policy variable and the outcome of interest (confounders) then need
to be controlled for in the empirical estimations (Besley and Case 2000).
To identify confounding variables in our set-up, we start by studying the semi-
nal theoretical work of Meltzer and Richard (1981). They show that higher inequal-
ity tends to cause higher levels of redistribution, because the median voter favors
the more redistribution, the further away she is from the mean income. Hayes et al.
(1991) and Schwabish et al. (2006), among others, confirm empirically that the in-
come distribution indeed impacts social expenditures. The results in the literature
thus suggest that there is an effect of redistributive policies on levels of inequal-
ity, but, at the same time, inequality also influences governments’ policies. This
mechanism of reverse causality makes the econometric identification of the effect of
redistributive measures on income inequality particularly difficult. Simply regress-
ing inequality on redistribution levels neglects that high redistribution might have
occurred in societies with high inequality in the first place. We further discuss this
2See Niehues (2010) for a more thorough discussion of this argument.
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problem and our identification approaches to overcome endogeneity in the empirical
Sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.1.
We rely on several datasets on inequality to make the results more robust to
measurement problems (see Section 2 for a discussion of data sets and problems).3
We exploit within country variation in a relatively long time series of OECD coun-
tries (1981 – 2005) and apply different identification strategies, using fixed effects
and instrumental variable approaches, to tackle problems of endogeneity. In addi-
tion, we use a rather new data set to measure the effect of tax progressivity.
Our results partly confirm that redistributive policies based on government
expenditure serve their aim to reduce inequality, despite potential offsetting second-
round effects. As for our precisely estimated coefficients, we find that 1% increases in
government spending and public social expenditure are roughly related to 0.3% and
0.2%, respectively, drops in inequality. The effects of changes in tax progressivity
are smaller and often insignificant implying that indirect behavioral effects play
a (bigger) role with tax progressivity. This suggests that governments aiming at
reducing inequality should, c.p., rely more on social expenditure rather than on
increasing the progressivity of income taxes. Our results also show that (different)
inequality data sources should always be handled with caution.
Despite its policy relevance, the causal effect of redistributive policies on the
income distribution has so far found surprisingly little attention in the literature.4
Chong and Gradstein (2007) find that the quality of institutions positively affects
the distribution of incomes. Checchi and Garcia-Penalosa (2008) and Checchi and
Garcia-Penalosa (2010) find empirical evidence for the importance of labor market
institutions on reducing inequality when applying a three-stage-least-squares esti-
mator. Calderon and Chong (2009) look at a similar research question and obtain
confirmative results. Niehues (2010) provides evidence that more generous welfare
states, in terms of total social benefits relative to GDP, achieve higher economic
equality. Duncan and Sabirianova-Peter (2008) find that progressive taxation re-
duces income inequality based on an IV approach. The study of Roine et al. (2009)
establishes a negative relationship between inequality and government spending as
a share of GDP as well as top marginal tax rates, while Cooper et al. (2011) exploit
variation in US federal and state taxes to find that tax policies, on the federal level
in particular, compress the income distribution.
The proceeding of this paper is as follows. We first discuss several data sources
3We, however, refrain from merging different data sources as inequality data are usually not
comparable across data sources.
4This is certainly partly due to the inherent problems of endogeneity and reverse causality.
Issues of data quality, as discussed in Section 2, are another reason.
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for measures of inequality (Section 2). In a next step, Section 3 exploits all data
sources discussed to sketch the development of inequality in OECD countries over
time. Section 4 contains the regression analyses. Therein, the included variables and
their data sources are presented, before fixed effects and IV models are estimated
and discussed. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Inequality Data
The use of (readily available) inequality data usually comes with a considerable
amount of pitfalls (Atkinson and Brandolini 2001). Conducting a cross-country
study over time, we particularly have to attach importance to consistency and
comparability of the data both over time and between countries. Although Gini
coefficients—the most common and popular measure of inequality—are available
for a wide range of countries, comparability remains a major problem and meth-
ods of calculating are often inconsistent across different datasets, and sometimes
even within the same dataset. Consequently, as put forward by Atkinson and Bran-
dolini (2001, p. 772), “we cannot therefore be sure whether results of comparative
or econometric analyses obtained using such data are genuine or a product of data
differences.”5 For example, one major problem in calculating the Gini coefficient
is that the unit of analysis sometimes is the entire household, whereas it is the
individual elsewhere (Atkinson and Brandolini 2001; Galbraith and Kum 2005).
In this paper, we attempt to achieve the best-possible consistency by, firstly,
not blending together inequality data from different data sources, which rely on
different methods of calculating inequality measures, and secondly, by restricting
our analyses to a set of relatively homogeneous OECD countries. We, thirdly, also
employ different datasets in order to increase the robustness of the results.
Another pitfall in many datasets is that they either do not cover many countries
and points of time or are highly unbalanced. This often hinders the use of advanced
econometric panel data techniques. Data restrictions also forbid to look at different
types of inequality. We have to rely on inequality in disposable income in all analyses,
although it might as well be interesting to look at wage or wealth inequalities.
As for the measurement of income inequality, we mostly rely on the Gini
coefficient which is by far the most frequently used measure of inequality in the
literature. In order to achieve a sufficient high coverage of countries and points of
time, the reliance on the Gini coefficient is inevitable. The data used in our analyses
5In their survey of inequality data, Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) provide many examples of
inconsistencies both across and within datasets.
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exhibit the largest coverage of OECD countries over time among all data sources
consisting of inequality measures. Having the drawbacks and restrictions regarding
data and inequality measurements in mind, we describe the datasets used in our
analyses in the following.6
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Data of the LIS (LIS 2012) provide the
possibility to derive inequality measures from individual-level data, which are con-
sistent both across time and between countries. All measures are based on national
household surveys. The original data are harmonized and standardized on the in-
dividual level before the aggregated Gini coefficients are calculated. This ensures a
high comparability of the data, but makes a wide coverage of countries and years
impossible. Although 24 OECD countries are included in the dataset in total, there
are only between 8 to 17 countries represented in each wave, also indicating that
the panel is highly unbalanced. The LIS data also contain information on several
ratios relating the income shares of different percentiles (90/10, 90/50, 80/20). We
do not employ these variables in our main analyses because comparable information
are not available in the other data sources we use, but only in robustness checks in
order to explore the effects of policies in different parts of the income distribution.
UN World Income Inequality Database (WIID) Based at the United Na-
tions University World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER
2008), this dataset is one of the largest and most comprehensive inequality panel
data sets. It builds on the dataset by Deininger and Squire (1996)7, but goes beyond
it by increasing the number of included countries, extending the time frame up to
2006. We employ the latest version of the data, named WIID V2.0C as of May 2008
to obtain Gini coefficients. The coverage of both countries and years is relatively
large. The unbalanced panel we rely on consists of 30 OECD countries between 1980
and 2006; on average there are 18.2 countries per year. The data contain a variable
indicating the quality and reliability of the respective Gini coefficient and we only
rely on the highest level of data quality for our analysis.
6We utilize the Quality of Government (QoG) Social Policy Dataset provided by Samanni et al.
(2010). It combines and merges different country-level data sources, among which are all inequality
data sources we employ in our analyses.
7The initial Deininger and Squire data are among the most widely used data sources in the
literature on inequality. The dataset only includes measures of the Gini coefficients that meet
three conditions: data are (i) based on household surveys, (ii) cover a sufficient share of the
population and (iii) considers a comprehensive coverage of different income sources. However, it is
yet criticized for its various inconsistencies, most strikingly in the use of different income concepts
(e.g., Atkinson and Brandolini 2001). The original data only run until 1996, which is why we rely
on the UNU-WIDER extension.
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University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) Based at the University of
Texas, this data source (Galbraith and Kum 2005; Galbraith 2009) is intended to
overcome pitfalls identified in the Deininger and Squire (1996) data. The basic idea
behind the estimates of inequality is that the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO) provides consistent measures of inequality of wages in the
industrial sector, which are likely to be related to household income inequality. To
obtain estimates of inequality, the Deininger and Squire (1996) data are regressed
on: (i) inequality in manufacturing pay—obtained from the UNIDO—, (ii) the share
of workers in the manufacturing sector to the population, and (iii) three dummies
of data sources8 used by Deininger and Squire (1996). The resulting estimates then
serve as the measures of inequality. Compared to the Deininger and Squire (1996)
dataset, they also extend the coverage of both time and countries. All in all, 28
OECD countries are represented between 1963 and 2002. On average, there are 25.8
country observations per year.
3 The Development of Inequality over Time
In this section, we present descriptive overviews of the development of inequality
over time. For brevity, besides looking at the OECD average, we classify countries
into several types of homogeneous welfare states. As the welfare type groups differ
with respect to institutions such as power of unions in wage bargaining, generosity
of unemployment benefits, tax systems, etc., systematic differences across welfare
type families provide a first hint that institutions matter for levels of inequality.9
Figures 1 and 2 below, as well as Figures 3 and 4 in the Appendix, display
inequality trends over time. We calculate moving averages of 5 years in order to
smooth the time lines. Using all three different data sources, we first examine the
development of inequality for the average of all OECD countries in Figure 1. The
unit of measurement for the LIS and WIID data is the Gini coefficient, UTIP data
represent estimates as described before. Although all three data sources depict dif-
ferent developments and trends, there appears to be a common pattern: Average
inequality in OECD countries has increased since the early and mid 1980s, confirm-
ing the discussions held in the public media. Both the WIID and UTIP data suggest
a little decrease since 2000, while the LIS data display a large increase.
8Income vs. expenditure, gross vs. net of taxes, household vs. personal unit of analysis.
9Following the literature, we sort countries into the following welfare regimes: Liberal (Canada,
Japan, Switzerland, US, South Korea, New Zealand, Mexico), Social-democratic (Denmark, Fin-
land, Iceland, Norway, Sweden), Conservative (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg,
Netherlands), Radical (Australia, Ireland, UK), Southern (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey),
and Eastern (Czech Republic, Hungary, South Korea, Poland, Slovakia).
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Figure 1: Inequality in OECD over time
Looking at inequality trends separately for different types of welfare regimes
in Figure 2 (where the UTIP dataset is used), we confirm the pattern that inequal-
ity has increased since the early/mid eighties. The trends show that the rise is
the highest in eastern and radical welfare types. While it had the lowest levels
of inequality before their transition from socialism to democracies, the family of
eastern countries has experienced a large increase since 1990; putting their levels
of inequality above levels in social-democratic and conservative welfare states, and
lately even above southern countries. As expected, the social-democratic welfare
regimes have both the lowest inequality levels and increases. The observation that,
for example, radical and liberal welfare states are characterized by more inequality
than social-democratic or conservative ones provides a hint that institutions seem
to matter for the income distribution. The large rise in inequality in Eastern Euro-
pean states since the breakdown of socialism in the late 80s/early 90s adds to this
presumption. Although Figures 3 and 4 in the Appendix depict different trends,
the basic patterns are similar as in the UTIP data. However, the results show that
inequality is measured highly inconsistently across different data sources, suggesting
that different data should not be blended in analyses.
4 The Role of Redistributive Policies
In order to analyze the effect of redistributive policies on inequality trends, we
use different econometric methods which are described below. We start with the
variables used for the analysis and some summary statistics.
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Figure 2: Inequality (utip) by welfare types
4.1 Data Sources and Variables
Dependent Variable: Inequality The measures of inequality are obtained from
the data sources discussed and described in Section 2. The sufficient number of
observations in these data sets allows to conduct econometric panel analyses. The
WIID and LIS data measure inequality with the Gini coefficient, whereas UTIP
provides inequality estimates based on a regression estimation (see discussion above).
(Explanatory) Policy Variables of Interest We are interested in the effect of
redistributive policy measures on the distribution of incomes. In the analyses we look
at three different explanatory variables, which are aimed to capture and measure
policies of redistribution: Our first explanatory variable of interest is the level of
(total) government spending (on all fiscal levels) in a country which is obtained from
the Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 2009). This is clearly a very broad measure
of government activity including not only redistributive expenditures. However, in
the western-industrialized OECD countries in our sample, the largest share (usually
around 50%) of total government spending is attributed to redistributive expenses
such as social benefits, welfare, pensions and public health care (OECD 2012e). In
order to narrow down the scope, we directly look at total public social expenditure
as our second explanatory variable. The data are provided by the OECD’s “Social
Expenditure Dataset” (OECD 2012e). The variable measures the level of public
expenditure of all types—cash benefits, in kind benefits/social services—of social
measures. Obviously, social benefits are mainly targeted to the poorest fraction of
the population; hence they are clearly expected to reduce income inequalities. The
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variables are available for almost all OECD countries in the period between 1980
and 2005.
While the first two variables measure the government expenditure side, the
third variable of interest, degree of progressivity, looks at the government’s revenue
side. While the size of government is already captured by government expenditures
(which should be equal to government revenue—at least in the long-run) we think
that it is also important to analyze the degree of redistribution in the (progressive)
income tax system (while additionally controlling for the confounding effects of
proportional consumption and payroll taxes; see below). The progressivity data are
taken from the World Tax Indicators (WTI) (Sabirianova-Peter et al. 2010). This
large and new panel data set covers personal income tax structures at the country
level in 189 countries for the period 1981 to 2005 and contains various important
variables such as average and marginal tax rates, progressivity or complexity. The
measure of progressivity is the average rate progression (ARP) variable which is
calculated as follows (Sabirianova-Peter et al. 2010): average tax rates for each
country and year in the data set are first computed for 100 evenly spread pre-
tax incomes. ARP is then constructed by regressing tax rates on the log of gross
income. The tax system is progressive, proportional and regressive if the resulting
slope coefficient of the income variable is positive, zero or negative, respectively. In
all specifications employing ARP as the explanatory variable, we also control for
the general level of taxation by including a variable for the top marginal income tax
rate. This ensures that we identify the effect that directly stems from progressivity,
rather than high tax rates.
For reasons of facilitating the interpretation of our results, we use the logged
values of the independent variables of interest in all our estimations. Together
with logged inequality as the dependent variable, the coefficients allow an intuitive
elasticity interpretation.
Control Variables We aim to capture confounding factors by including a stan-
dard set of control variables as common in the literature into our estimations which
are likely to affect both our left-hand-side variable inequality, as well as the ex-
planatory variables of interest. From the “National Accounts” of the United Na-
tions Statistics Division (United Nations 2012) we obtain variables for real GDP
per capita (in constant 1990 US dollar prices) and openness to trade, measured as
exports plus imports as a share of GDP (constant 1990 prices). Our estimations
also control for squared GDP per capita in order to allow for non-linear effects of
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GDP on inequality (Kuznets 1955).10 The inflation rate and unemployment rate
come from the OECD’s “Main Economic Indicators” (OECD 2012b) and “Labor
Force Statistics” (OECD 2012d), respectively. In order to control for the power of
employees in wage bargaining, we use a measure of the net union density, measured
as net union membership as a percentage of all wage earners, taken from the OECD
employment database (OECD 2012a). Levels of higher education, which might con-
found both inequality but also policy measures to reduce inequality, are accounted
for by World Development Indicator (Worldbank 2012) data of tertiary school en-
rollment. We also control for an index of globalization as developed and described
by Dreher (2006) because more globalized countries tend to have both higher levels
of inequality and less policy measures aiming at reducing inequality.11
Summary Statistics Table 3 in the Appendix provides summary statistics of all
included variables. N indicates the number of country-year observations for each
variable. Over the time span of interest, we observe variation of inequality measures
both within and between countries, where within variation is considerably smaller.
The same holds true for our explanatory variables of interest and the controls. Our
identification strategies will nevertheless solely exploit these within country varia-
tions. The statistics also reveal that the number of country-year observations differs
across the measures of inequality as well as our explanatory variable. The follow-
ing analyses try to maximize the number of observations. This has the drawback
that each specification is based on a slightly different sample, depending on which
variables are included, because the panel is highly unbalanced.
4.2 Fixed Effects Panel Estimations
4.2.1 Identification Strategy
Generally, we analyze our research question in a panel of OECD countries between
1981 and 2005. The regression equation that we estimate reads:
Yi,t = β1xi,t−1 + β2Ci,t−1 + γt + µi + i,t, (1)
where i denotes a country and t the point of time. xi,t−1 is one of the lagged policy
variables of interest and Ci,t−1 is a vector of several lagged control variables. Time
10Also see Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) for theoretical background.
11Roine et al. (2009) additionally control for measures of financial asset prices and profit income
which could have an impact on inequality. Unfortunately, such information is not available to us
as the data used by Roine et al. (2009) is only available for a very limited set of countries.
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and country fixed effects are captured by γt and µi, respectively. Yi,t indicates the
level of inequality. i,t is a standard error term and our coefficient of interest is β1.
In the Introduction we discussed the problem that policy measures are usu-
ally endogenous, requiring the researcher to control for any driving variables that
shape both the policy of interest itself and the outcome variable. By estimating
the model as in equation 1 we take several steps to overcome such problems of en-
dogeneity. Firstly, we include a set of standard control variables that are believed
to be confounding factors. Omitting these would lead to omitted variable bias and
load onto the coefficients of our policy variables of interest. These control variables
are discussed above and it does not require extensive explanations why we believe
that they might affect both Y and x. Despite the inclusion of these controls, there
remains doubt whether all confounding variables are removed from .
This, secondly, motivates us to include a set of country fixed effects into our
estimation. We thereby control for permanent differences across countries in the
redistributive policies as well as inequality, and solely exploit within-country vari-
ation in our estimations. If the reverse causality mechanism is systematic within
countries—i.e., if the way how levels of inequality affect redistributive policies is
always similar across time within a country—, then these time invariant country
characteristics and systematic channels are controlled for by the country fixed ef-
fects. That is, the country fixed effects approach ensures that we are able to control
for any mechanism of reverse causality that is systematic within a country. Other
time invariant confounding factors are controlled for as well.12 Our third step to
identify unbiased effects is to include a set of year fixed effects, which account for
any year specific effects and help us to control for spurious relations stemming from
common trends in the variables on the left- and right-side of the equation. Fourthly,
all our right-hand-side variables are lagged one year, so that we estimate the effect
of redistributive policies in a year t − 1 on inequality in year t. Such an approach
further mitigates the problem of simultaneity bias caused by the fact that varying
inequality levels also affect policies of redistribution. The estimated standard errors
used for judging the statistical significance are cluster-adjusted for countries.
4.2.2 Results
Table 1 displays the coefficients and results for the variables of interest, while detailed
tables including all control variables can be found in Appendix C. Each panel in
the Table presents the results for a different dataset to measure inequality. The
12The country fixed effects also account for possible systematic and time invariant differences in
the measurement of inequality.
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results provide hints that within-country variation in the expenditure variables can
explain varying levels of inequality, whereas progressive taxation seems to be less
effective. The obtained coefficients are slightly different depending on the measure of
inequality, indicating that data on economic inequality are inconsistently measured
and barely comparable.
The coefficients of interests are to be interpreted in terms of elasticities. They
display the percentage change in inequality in response to a 1% increase in the re-
spective regressor. We are primarily interested in the coefficients of the policy vari-
ables government spending, social expenditure, and progressivity. Not all of these are
precisely estimated and for some point estimates we obtain relatively large standard
errors and confidence intervals, which do not allow a confidential rejection of the
null hypotheses that the estimates are different from zero. However, as for precisely
estimated coefficients, the signs point in the expected direction. The data partly
suggest that redistributive measures of government expenditure are indeed able to
achieve less inequality. Roughly speaking, a 1% increase in government spending or
social expenditure decreases inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) by 0.3%
or 0.2%, respectively. The coefficient on tax progressivity is mostly smaller and, as
for the significant coefficients, varies between -0.2% and -0.04%.13
This might hint into the direction that higher tax progressivity triggers behav-
ioral effects which tend to increase pre-tax inequality and hence offset the inequality
reducing first-round effects (Poterba 2007), whereas the effect of (well-designed)
transfer programs might yield less prevalent behavioral responses.14 Indeed, recent
empirical evidence supports this view. First, elasticities of taxable income, i.e. be-
havioral responses to progressive tax rates, are usually higher at the top than at
the bottom of the distribution (see, e.g., the survey by Saez et al. 2012). Second,
Chetty et al. (2013) show that the EITC in the US, an in-work benefit program
targeted at the bottom of the distribution, has indeed raised net incomes at the low
end of the income distribution significantly with limited work disincentive effects.
Regarding the effects of the control variables (see Appendix C), we obtain re-
sults which are mostly in line with previous studies and intuition. Whereas within-
13We choose the Gini coefficient not only because it is the most widely used measure with the
biggest data coverage but also because it takes into account the whole income distribution (albeit
being most sensitive to changes in the middle). The LIS data also contains information about
percentile ratios. Employing those in a robustness check (not shown) as left-hand side variables
broadly confirms the results found with the Gini coefficient. Interestingly, but not surprisingly,
social expenditure (tax progressivity) is more important in reducing inequality in measures which
are more sensitive at the bottom (top) of the distribution.
14Note that a long literature on the (optimal) progressivity of the income tax system exists (see
Piketty and Saez 2013 for a recent survey). However, there is very little evidence on the causal
effect of (progressive) taxes on inequality – as discussed in the Introduction.
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country variation in GDP or GDP-squared do not have significant effects on in-
equality, we find some weak evidence that inflation has a small negative effect. The
estimations further show that union density has a strong and significantly negative
impact on income inequality, suggesting that the variation in union density within
countries over time has a significant impact on varying levels of the income distri-
bution. The results for the effect of female labor force participation are ambiguous.
Depending on the data source used to measure inequality, we find either insignif-
icant or slightly positive effects. The coefficients for most of the other controlled
confounders are mostly not significantly different from zero.
4.2.3 Discussion
The models above, using both country and time fixed effects, yield some hints that
redistributive policies can reduce inequality levels. However, due to possible re-
maining endogeneity and imprecise coefficients, we do not find clear-cut evidence
that second-round effects do not offset redistributive policy measures—especially for
progressive taxation. The estimated elasticities and confidence intervals differ de-
pending on the employed dependent variable. This raises concerns about the general
data quality (see the discussion in Section 2).
We must further be concerned that our identification strategy is not sufficient
in order to obtain unbiased effects. The problem of reverse causality is not properly
accounted for if the effect of inequality levels on redistribution policies is not sys-
tematic within countries. It might, for example, be the case that levels of inequality
in a year t − 1 affect policies in t in a not systematic way, yielding the necessity
to control for lagged levels of inequality. Doing so in the above framework would
however not be legitimate.
One commonly used way of dealing with such dynamic problems is to include
lagged levels of the dependent variable into the set of explanatory variable and
estimate the equation using GMM methods as first suggested by Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998),15 and applied in our context, e.g., by Calderon
and Chong (2009). Unfortunately, however, these estimators are not appropriate for
models with small N and large T like our panel (Roodman 2009; Roine et al. 2009).
Another reason for GMM methods not to be applicable to our setting rests
on our scepticism that the required assumption of “weak exogeneity” is met. The
assumption of weak exogeneity allows the explanatory variables to be correlated
with past and current levels of the error term, but not with its future realizations.
15This approach builds on the first-difference GMM estimator originally proposed by Arellano
and Bond (1991).
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Table 1: Fixed-Effects Panel Estimations
Dependent Variable: Measure of Inequality
Panel A: LIS Gini
Gov’t Spending -0.380∗∗∗ -0.356∗∗∗
(lagged) (0.120) (0.108)
Social Expenditure -0.232∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗
(lagged) (0.092) (0.091)
Progressivity 0.007 -0.132∗∗ -0.015
(lagged) (0.108) (0.061) (0.097)
Observations 120 117 116 113 117
R2 0.546 0.545 0.564 0.588 0.515
Panel B: WIID Gini
Gov’t Spending -0.307∗∗ -0.230∗∗
(lagged) (0.113) (0.104)
Social Expenditure -0.051 -0.023
(lagged) (0.076) (0.080)
Progressivity 0.041 0.049 0.036
(lagged) (0.046) (0.045) (0.050)
Observations 368 351 349 338 351
R2 0.314 0.299 0.328 0.339 0.280
Panel C: UTIP Estimate
Gov’t Spending -0.103 -0.081
(lagged) (0.076) (0.090)
Social Expenditure 0.001 -0.004
(lagged) (0.052) (0.054)
Progressivity -0.025 -0.021 -0.031
(lagged) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
Observations 437 389 378 353 389
R2 0.493 0.435 0.553 0.518 0.425
Fixed-Effects OLS regressions based on equation 1. Dependent variables are
measures of inequality. Panels A to C use different data sources. All right-
hand side variables are lagged one year. Lagged control variables as well
as country and year fixed effects are included but not displayed. Standard
errors in parentheses are cluster adjusted for countries. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗< 0.05,
∗∗∗ < 0.01
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There are reasons to believe that this assumption is barely justifiable in our setting.
We have a reverse causality effect at hand, where redistribution does not only de-
crease inequality, but where inequality also positively affects levels of redistribution.
Applying the assumption of weak exogeneity to our case implies that the system-
GMM estimator, using internal instruments, would only be valid if future levels of
inequality do not affect the current levels of the policy variables of interest: mea-
sures of redistribution. However, governments, that expect increasing inequality in
the future, could implement redistributive measures to offset the anticipated shock
on income inequality. Also, sticking with the logic of the Meltzer and Richard (1981)
model, the median voter who expects rising levels of inequality in the future will
vote for more redistribution. We are therefore skeptical that the assumption of weak
exogeneity is likely to hold in our set-up.
4.3 Instrumental Variable Approach
Another possibility to deal with the obvious problem of endogeneity in our setting
and to identify an unbiased effect is to find an instrumental variable (IV).
4.3.1 Identification Strategy
Our (second-stage) equation of interest is similar as in the previous section and reads
Yi,t = β3xi,t + β4Ci,t + γt + µi + i,t, (2)
where β3 is the coefficient of interest. As discussed above, we raise the concern
that omitted variables in the error term might be correlated with our explanatory
variables of interest, biasing the estimates. We aim to employ instruments zi,t which
are correlated to our respective measures of interest, but, conditioning on other
variables, are not correlated with the dependent variable, i.e. Cov(zi,t, i,t) = 0 and
Cov(zi,t, xi,t) 6= 0. We estimate the IV model using two stage least squares (2SLS).
Our first-stage equation looks such as
xi,t = δ1zi,t + δ2Ci,t + γt + µi + νi,t, (3)
where we include the same control variables as well as country and year fixed effects
as on the second-stage, and νi,t is a standard error term. The instrument z must not
affect  after conditioning on the confounding variables in vector C and the fixed
effects γ and µ. We hence wish to exploit within-country variation in an instrument
to identify our effect of interest, again hoping to control for any country systematic
15
unobservable effects.
Finding suitable instruments is generally a difficult task. In our set-up, we
require IVs that are independent of i,t in equation 2, but correlated with one of our
three respective explanatory variables of interest (represented by xi,t: government
spending, public total social expenditure, and degree of progressivity). An ideal
instrument would be randomly assigned to each observation and therefore generate a
quasi-experimental way to estimate the causal effect. Obviously, no such instrument
is available in our setting with country-level observations. Policies or other variables
that may be correlated with measures of redistribution are usually not randomly
assigned to a country and thus mostly endogenous. We are not aware of any study
that uses a randomly assigned instrument to identify the effect of policy variables
on inequality in a country-level setting.
In this paper, we use the initial levels of our policy variables as of 1981 and
extrapolate them with the growth rate of GDP—for government spending and social
expenditure—, and the growth rate of the highest marginal tax rate (MTR)—for
the level of progressivity. The extrapolated figures are then used as instruments
for the explanatory variables of interest. That is, our IVs take the initial value of
the respective regressor in 1981 and then grow with the growth rate of GDP or the
growth rate of the highest MTR.
Our instruments are exogenous in the sense that we do not use the actual
observed annual levels but extrapolated figures that are based on the initial levels
in 1981. The instrument for one of the regressors may increase between two years
within a country, whereas the actual level of the regressor remains stable. Though,
we observe a strong correlation between the extrapolated numbers and the actual
ones for our measures of government spending and social spending, hence satisfying
the IV relevance requirement. For the exclusion restriction to hold, we have to
assume that, conditional on our control variables and fixed effects, the inequality
trends are uncorrelated with the (average) growth rates used for extrapolation. This
can be justified because GDP and the top tax rate are, among other variables,
controlled for on both stages of our estimation. We display first stage results at the
bottom of our detailed tables in Section D of the Appendix.16
16Angrist and Pischke (2009) note that insufficient first-stage results in exactly identified models
do not do any harm except causing second-stage standard errors to be large. This is why we abstain
from i) discussing the relevance of the instruments in detail and ii) only focus on sufficiently precise
estimates in our interpretations of the results.
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4.3.2 Results
Table 2 presents the coefficients of interest for our IV estimations. Similar to the re-
sults in section 4.2, our measures of government expenditure seem to have inequality
reducing effects, whereas we find tax progressivity to have a smaller impact, mostly
not significantly different from zero. Again, not all coefficients are sufficiently pre-
cise, but for those that are, we find that government spending compress the income
distribution. A 1% increase in this variable is approximately associated with a 0.3%
drop in inequality. The effect of social expenditures is again sligthly smaller with
an elasticity of -0.2% for the precise coefficients. This confirms the pattern that we
found in our previous analyses. The results for instrumented tax progressivity are
not precisely estimated; thus not allowing any clear interpretation, but providing
another hint that behavioral second-round effects play a stronger role with progres-
sivity. The results regarding the control variables are presented in Appendix D and
are similar to the fixed effects models.
4.3.3 Discussion
The results of the IV regressions rest on the assumption of instrument validity. That
is, conditional on all control variables as well as the country and year fixed effects,
the instruments must affect inequality only through the independent variables of
interest. This assumption is untestable and its validity needs to be approached
intuitively. Clearly, our instruments are not randomly assigned to each country-
year observation and it is therefore difficult to claim that we are able to establish
a causal relationship that is based on a quasi-experimental setup. However, as we
extrapolate government spending and social expenditure in 1981 with the GDP
growth rate and tax progressivity with the growth rate of the highest marginal tax
rate to obtain our instruments, we are able to exploit some exogenous variation. The
extrapolated values are not directly related to inequality. Of course, the growth rate
of the GDP and marginal tax rate, which we use for extrapolation, have some impact
on the income distribution, but we control for GDP and tax rate on both the first
and second stage and hence condition on these variables. All our analyses contain
not only year fixed-effects, but also country fixed effects. We thus exploit within-
country variation in our instruments and control for any effects that are specific to
the included countries and systematic across time.
The results are not entirely satisfying. Although we find negative coefficients—
that one would expect—in most specifications, the standard errors in some cases
are large and imprecise, causing p-values and significance values to be high. In IV
estimations, weak first-stage results can increase the standard errors on the second-
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Table 2: IV Estimations
Dependent Variable: Measure of Inequality
Panel A: LIS Gini
Gov’t Spending 0.024 0.003
(0.218) (0.226)
Social Expenditure -0.216∗∗ -0.295∗∗
(0.106) (0.116)
Progressivity 0.035 -0.116∗ 1.252
(0.070) (0.069) (0.789)
Observations 107 106 86 85 79
Panel B: WIID Gini
Gov’t Spending -0.152 -0.110
(0.153) (0.162)
Social Expenditure -0.107 -0.039
(0.138) (0.139)
Progressivity 0.098∗ 0.082 -0.223
(0.053) (0.053) (0.854)
Observations 334 331 287 285 288
Panel C: UTIP Estimate
Gov’t Spending -0.328∗∗∗ -0.333∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.101)
Social Expenditure -0.026 -0.016
(0.076) (0.082)
Progressivity -0.017 -0.048∗∗ 0.167
(0.022) (0.024) (0.414)
Observations 414 405 344 337 353
Fixed-Effects IV regressions based on equation 2. Dependent variables are
measures of inequality. Panels A to C use different data sources. First-stages
are based on equation 3 (see Appendix tables for first stage statistics). IVs
are extrapolated values of the explanatory variables of interest. Control
variables as well as country and year fixed effects are included but not
displayed. Standard errors in parentheses are cluster adjusted for countries.
∗ < 0.10, ∗∗< 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01
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stage, but this is mostly not the reason in our case; first-stage results are sufficiently
strong at least for specifications which employ government spending and social ex-
penditure as core explanatory variables. Negative coefficients estimated with more
precision—that we obtain as well—, however, provide some evidence that first-round
effects of redistributive expenditure policies can outweigh second-round effects and
governments are indeed able to achieve inequality reduction.
5 Conclusion
This paper uses a panel of industrialized OECD countries over the time period
between 1981 and 2005 to analyze the effect of redistributive policies on post-tax
inequality. Using different data sources to measure inequality, the first part of this
paper finds that the Gini coefficient has increased since the early 1980s, after a
period of downwards trending inequality between the 1960s and 1980s. The obser-
vation that radical and liberal welfare states are characterized by more inequality
than social-democratic or conservative ones provides a hint that institutions seem
to matter for the income distribution. The large rise in inequality in Eastern Euro-
pean states since the breakdown of socialism in the late 80s/early 90s adds to this
presumption.
The analysis also shows that different data sources of the Gini coefficient dis-
play different levels as well as developments in inequality, suggesting that the use of
empirical inequality measures may be critical and results might depend on the data
source. This is confirmed in our regression analyses which find coefficients to differ
both in terms of size and precision depending on which data source is used.
However, assuming that the data are consistently measured within one data
source, the ordinal character of the data can be exploited to conduct regression
analyses with inequality as the dependent variable.17 Exploiting this reasoning,
the second part of this paper asks the question of whether redistributive policies
significantly reduce inequality. We discuss potential sources of endogeneity and
employ fixed effects and instrumental variable approaches to identify the effect of
three policy variables of interest. Despite behavioral feedback effects, we provide
some evidence that especially government spending and social expenditure meet their
target of reducing post-government inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient.
As for our precisely estimated coefficients, our different identification methods
yield that a 1% increase in government spending or public social expenditure is
17This is inherent to many other data sources, in which cardinal measurement is critical to
assume. See for example the discussion on happiness research in Frey and Stutzer (2002).
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roughly related to a 0.3% drop in inequality. Our results also show that policies
of government expenditure seem to matter more for reducing inequality than the
degree of progressivity in the tax system. The insignificant results for the latter
might hint into the direction that higher tax progressivity indeed exhibits (stronger)
behavioral effects, which tend to increase pre-tax inequality and hence countervail
the inequality reducing direct effects (Poterba 2007).
Hence, given the disincentive and distorting effects of progressive taxation,
our results might imply that governments should combat inequality through pro-
gressive transfers rather than increasing the progressivity of the tax system. Our
findings might also help explaining observed differences in inequality between Euro-
pean countries and the US. While the US has a very progressive income tax schedule,
very little redistribution occurs through social benefits. In contrast, European wel-
fare states rely (on average) much more on benefits and government expenditure
to fight inequality. As recent evidence has shown, the introduction of the EITC in
the US, an in-work benefit program targeted at the bottom of the distribution, has
effectively reduced inequality without large disincentive effects (Chetty et al. 2013).
Expanding the EITC and other benefits might be a fruitful way forward in order to
combat rising inequality.
The difficulties of identifying a clear and clean causal effect are omnipresent
and inherent to this literature. Scholars would require either a field experiment or
good quasi-experimental design to obtain a clear-cut causal picture. Obviously—and
this problem is underlying almost all, if not all, country-level studies—it is nearly
impossible to exploit such an identification strategy, i.e., to randomly assign redis-
tributive policies to a set of countries. We identify possible sources of endogeneity in
our setting and take several steps to overcome it. The Fixed Effects and IV methods
used here can certainly mitigate problems of endogeneity, but there remains doubt
if they are sufficient.
Looking at single policy changes in redistribution (the “treatment”), Difference-
in-Difference (DiD) analyses may help to identify a clear effect. Though, the re-
quired “common trend” assumption across both countries is often difficult to de-
fend. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) recently proposed a
new approach based on a “synthetic” counterfactual country (region). The method
uses a combination of other countries (regions) on similar pre-treatment character-
istics to run an analysis similar to DiD, where the matched synthetic country serves
as the counterfactual. However, in terms of the research question imposed in this
paper, DiD and synthetic-country approaches are not appropriate because we do
not look at the effect of one particular policy change on inequality. System-GMM
methods may also be able to handle some of the inherent problems of endogeneity,
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but require very rich data, which are often not available, and are highly sensitive to
specification and the choice of internal instruments. Additionally, in many set-ups—
including ours—System-GMM methods are not eligible due to panel structures with
small N and large T or due to the failure to assume “weak exogeneity”.18
Considering the political importance and widely held debates about (increas-
ing) inequality around the world, the research question imposed in our paper needs
further attention. Policy makers heavily rely on researchers and their analyses when
considering different measures of reducing inequality. Therefore, it is important that
the issue of causal identification will be further approached in future research.
18Another possible line for future research is along the lines of the works by Ja¨ntti and Jenkins
(2010) and Garc´ıa et al. (2013). Although both papers are based on the inequality effects of
macroeconomic factors in general, the approaches suggested have the potential to expand this type
of analysis to measure the effects of policies on inequality.
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Appendices
A Development of Inequality over time
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs
LIS Gini overall 30.34583 7.142591 N = 159
between 6.288292 n = 29
within 2.587905 T = 5.48276
WIID Gini overall 30.7561 6.026748 N = 448
between 5.885699 n = 28
within 2.65283 T = 16
UTIP Ineq overall 35.34152 4.735462 N = 580
between 4.171345 n = 28
within 2.434937 T = 20.7143
Govt Spending overall 8.16e+10 1.33e+11 N = 848
between 1.32e+11 n = 30
within 2.67e+10 T = 28.2667
Social Exp overall 1.24e+11 2.13e+11 N = 670
between 2.00e+11 n = 30
within 6.55e+10 T = 22.3333
ARP overall overall .0753014 .0243012 N = 697
between .0208241 n = 30
within .0133746 T = 23.2333
Toprate overall 44.63314 14.55172 N = 717
between 11.72463 n = 30
within 8.618669 T = 23.9
Educ overall 42.80875 20.99698 N = 759
between 13.80687 n = 28
within 17.03499 T = 27.1071
GDP p. capita overall 18500.42 10677.75 N = 848
between 10181.31 n = 30
within 4090.34 T = 28.2667
Inflation overall 9.100438 24.17119 N = 849
between 12.25823 n = 30
within 21.17695 T = 28.3
Trade overall 84.80983 53.20028 N = 848
between 46.59816 n = 30
within 29.29007 T = 28.2667
continues on next page
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Unemployment overall 7.16477 4.27503 N = 738
between 3.806607 n = 30
within 2.306527 T = 24.6
Union overall 38.69974 21.5432 N = 755
between 20.13219 n = 30
within 7.329944 T = 25.1667
Globalization overall 72.1562 12.95818 N = 800
between 10.25295 n = 30
within 7.867985 T = 26.6667
C Fixed Effects Panel Models (displaying control
variables)
Table 4: Dependent Variable LIS Gini
Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini
Gov’t Spending −0.380*** −0.356***
(0.120) (0.108)
Social Expenditure −0.232** −0.270***
(0.092) (0.091)
Progressivity 0.007 −0.132** −0.015
(0.108) (0.061) (0.097)
Top Tax Rate 0.001 0.003* 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
School enrollment 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Real GDP p.c. 0.000** 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP squared −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation −0.003* −0.003 −0.003* −0.005** −0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Openness to Trade −0.001 −0.001 −0.000 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Unemployment rate 0.011* 0.011* 0.008 0.009 0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Union density −0.004 −0.004 −0.003* −0.002 −0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
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Globalization 0.001 0.001 −0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
constant 11.963*** 11.335*** 9.145*** 9.336*** 2.756***
(2.976) (2.793) (2.363) (2.513) (0.805)
N 120 117 116 113 117
R2 0.546 0.545 0.564 0.588 0.515
Fixed-Effects OLS regressions based on equation 1. Dependent variables is a measure
of inequality. All right-hand side variables are lagged one year. Country and year fixed
effects are included but not displayed. Standard errors in parentheses are cluster adjusted
for countries. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗< 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01
Table 5: Dependent Variable WIID Gini
Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini
Gov’t Spending −0.307** −0.230**
(0.113) (0.104)
Social Expenditure −0.051 −0.023
(0.076) (0.080)
Progressivity 0.041 0.049 0.036
(0.046) (0.045) (0.050)
Top Tax Rate −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
School enrollment −0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Real GDP p.c. −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Openness to Trade 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Unemployment rate 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 −0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Union density −0.001 −0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Globalization 0.006* 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
constant 10.402*** 8.828*** 4.292** 3.960** 3.556***
(2.580) (2.436) (1.744) (1.826) (0.363)
N 368 351 349 338 351
R2 0.314 0.299 0.328 0.339 0.280
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Fixed-Effects OLS regressions based on equation 1. Dependent variables is a measure
of inequality. All right-hand side variables are lagged one year. Country and year fixed
effects are included but not displayed. Standard errors in parentheses are cluster adjusted
for countries. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗< 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01
Table 6: Dependent Variable UTIP estimate
UTIP UTIP UTIP UTIP UTIP
Gov’t Spending −0.103 −0.081
(0.076) (0.090)
Social Expenditure 0.001 −0.004
(0.052) (0.054)
Progressivity −0.025 −0.021 −0.031
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
Top Tax Rate 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
School enrollment 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Real GDP p.c. 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP squared −0.000 −0.000 −0.000** −0.000** −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation −0.000 −0.000 −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Openness to Trade 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployment rate 0.004** 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Union density −0.004*** −0.003** −0.002** −0.002 −0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Globalization −0.000 −0.000 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
constant 5.935*** 5.303** 3.486** 3.448** 3.480***
(1.830) (2.192) (1.282) (1.472) (0.354)
N 437 389 378 353 389
R2 0.493 0.435 0.553 0.518 0.425
Fixed-Effects OLS regressions based on equation 1. Dependent variables is a measure of inequality.
All right-hand side variables are lagged one year. Country and year fixed effects are included but
not displayed. Standard errors in parentheses are cluster adjusted for countries. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗< 0.05,
∗∗∗ < 0.01
30
D IV Models (displaying control variables and
first-stage results)
Table 7: Dependent Variable LIS Gini
Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini
Gov’t Spending 0.024 0.003
(0.218) (0.226)
Social Expenditure −0.216** −0.295**
(0.106) (0.116)
Progressivity 0.035 −0.116* 1.252
(0.070) (0.069) (0.789)
Top Tax Rate −0.006** −0.001 −0.029**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.013)
School enrollment −0.001 −0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Real GDP p.c. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP squared −0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation −0.002 −0.001 0.005* −0.003 0.036*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.021)
Openness to Trade −0.001 −0.001 −0.001* −0.001** −0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Unemployment rate 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011)
Union density −0.004** −0.005** −0.001 −0.000 −0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Globalization 0.012** 0.011* −0.002 −0.002 −0.011
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.014)
N 107 106 86 85 79
First-stage results
Coefficient IV 0.024** 0.024** 0.042*** 0.037*** −0.175
(0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.294)
F-Statistic 5.51 6.39 35.37 29.15 1.17
Fixed-Effects IV regressions based on equation 2. Dependent variables is a measure of
inequality. IVs are extrapolated values of the explanatory variables of interest. Displayed
first-stage results are coefficients from first-stage regressions of instrumented variable on
IV (as in equation 3). Country and year fixed effects are included but not displayed. F-
statistic indicates F-statistic of excluded instruments. Standard errors in parentheses are
cluster adjusted for countries. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗< 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01
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Table 8: Dependent Variable WIID Gini
Gini Gini Gini Gini Gini
Gov’t Spending −0.152 −0.110
(0.153) (0.162)
Social Expenditure −0.107 −0.039
(0.138) (0.139)
Progressivity 0.098* 0.082 −0.223
(0.053) (0.053) (0.854)
Top Tax Rate −0.002 −0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.015)
School enrollment −0.001 −0.001 −0.000 −0.001 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Real GDP p.c. −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation −0.003** −0.002 0.001 0.001 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Openness to Trade −0.000 0.000 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Unemployment rate 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001 −0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009)
Union density −0.000 −0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011)
Globalization 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.009
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
N 334 331 287 285 288
First-stage results
Coefficient IV 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.252
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.158)
F-Statistic 33.10 40.56 56.78 76.88 2.56
Fixed-Effects IV regressions based on equation 2. Dependent variables is a measure of
inequality. IVs are extrapolated values of the explanatory variables of interest. Displayed
first-stage results are coefficients from first-stage regressions of instrumented variable on
IV (as in equation 3). Country and year fixed effects are included but not displayed. F-
statistic indicates F-statistic of excluded instruments. Standard errors in parentheses are
cluster adjusted for countries. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗< 0.05, ∗∗∗ < 0.01
Table 9: Dependent Variable UTIP
UTIP UTIP UTIP UTIP UTIP
Gov’t Spending −0.328*** −0.333***
(0.096) (0.101)
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Social Expenditure −0.026 −0.016
(0.076) (0.082)
Progressivity −0.017 −0.048** 0.167
(0.022) (0.024) (0.414)
Top Tax Rate −0.000 0.000 −0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
School enrollment 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Real GDP p.c. 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP squared −0.000** −0.000** −0.000*** −0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation −0.000** −0.000* 0.003** 0.003** 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Openness to Trade 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Unemployment rate 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.004* 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Union density −0.003*** −0.003** −0.003*** −0.002 −0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Globalization 0.001 0.001 −0.001 −0.000 −0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
N 414 405 344 337 353
First-stage results
Coefficient IV 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.056*** 0.056*** −0.136
(0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.011) (0.179)
F-Statistic 26.24 29.13 20.70 26.15 0.57
Fixed-Effects IV regressions based on equation 2. Dependent variables is a measure of inequality.
IVs are extrapolated values of the explanatory variables of interest. Displayed first-stage results are
coefficients from first-stage regressions of instrumented variable on IV (as in equation 3). Country
and year fixed effects are included but not displayed. F-statistic indicates F-statistic of excluded
instruments. Standard errors in parentheses are cluster adjusted for countries. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗< 0.05,
∗∗∗ < 0.01
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